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The object of this essay is to explain why the distinctions made in euthanasia between 
killing vs. letting die and willingness to kill vs. unwillingness to kill are not relevant to 
real life euthanasia cases.  The specific purpose of the research is to isolate the relevant 
factor for debate when discussing the morality of euthanasia. It begins with a brief 
examination of some vocabulary that is commonly used when discussing euthanasia. 
Following this is a quick overview of what the word euthanasia meant in the ancient 
Greco-Roman world compared to what it means in the modern vernacular. I use an article 
by James Rachels about the lack of distinction between killing and letting die (which is 
one possible relevant factor) and a reply by William Nesbitt which attempts to shift the 
focus onto willingness to kill (another possible relevant factor). I conclude that Rachels is 
correct that killing and letting die are morally equivalent when all other factors are the 
same, but that other factors are never the same and that Nesbitt is closer to the real 
morally relevant factor in his discussion of willingness to kill. However, Nesbitt is not 
entirely correct or clear about his ideas. Willingness to kill can, in a case of euthanasia, 
be equivalent to a willingness to help and is not always a negative thing. The more 
generalized intention of the person performing the euthanasia is the most relevant factor 









The moral distinction (or lack of distinction) between killing a person and letting a 
person die is an important part of the debate over the legalization of euthanasia. This 
distinction between killing and letting die gets at a common way that people often think 
about the issue of euthanasia. The line of thinking goes roughly like this: “killing a 
person is morally worse than letting a person die, therefore doctors should be allowed to 
cease treatment of a patient and ‘let them die’ but should not be able to act upon the 
patient to cause their death, or ‘kill them’”. I will argue that this way of thinking is 
flawed as it is based on the premise that killing a person is morally worse than letting a 
person die. I will discuss killing and letting die here, but more importantly I will attempt 
to decide if the lack of distinction is relevant to the morality of euthanasia at all. If it is 
not, I will try to find out what is the morally relevant factor we should be judging.  
In the following sections I explain some basic concepts within the euthanasia debate 
and how euthanasia has been viewed throughout history. I then analyze two arguments 
about the distinction between killing and letting die. To do this analysis, I use an article 
by James Rachels (2010) who argues there is not a moral distinction between killing and 
letting die, and a response to this given by William Nesbitt (2010). Nesbitt argues that the 
more relevant factor to the morality of euthanasia is the actor’s willingness to kill. I think 
Nesbitt gets closer to the real morally relevant factor than Rachels but is also not very 
clear in his argument. I use the analysis of these two papers to assert that the distinction 
between killing and letting die is not relevant to the euthanasia debate as a whole. There 
is a factor that is more relevant than this and more relevant than ‘willingness to kill’ that 
should be considered. 
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II. Basic Concepts 
In order to understand the issues being discussed in this paper, some basic concepts 
must be established. This helps to categorize which parts of the euthanasia discussion are 
important to the argument that will be made later. To do this properly, the terms “active 
euthanasia” and “passive euthanasia” must be defined, along with the different sorts of 
consent a patient can give regarding these types of euthanasia.  
Active euthanasia is a term used to describe when a second party purposely acts upon 
a person who is suffering in a way that causes their death. Examples of this kind of 
euthanasia include giving the patient an overdose of pain medication or a lethal injection. 
These examples each have to be performed by one person on another and are meant to 
cause the death of the patient, thereby relieving that person of their suffering. In the case 
of passive euthanasia a second party withdraws treatment or life-sustaining measures 
from the suffering person allowing the natural sequence of events to unfold. It is still a 
form of euthanasia because in these cases the removal of life-sustaining measures from 
the person will certainly cause their death. Examples of passive euthanasia include 
removing the feeding tube or life support machine from a person who is in a coma and 
unable to perform the functions that the machine is doing to keep them alive. In certain 
cases death by passive euthanasia can be as slow and painful as whatever sickness or 
ailment the person was suffering from in the first place. 
In situations of potential euthanasia there are three sorts of consent that a patient can 
have. The first is voluntary euthanasia, in which a patient is in a right state of mind and 
asks to be euthanized. The second is involuntary euthanasia, in which a patient does not 
have the ability to consent and the decision to euthanize or not is made by a responsible 
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party like the family or a doctor. An example of involuntary consent is where a person is 
in a coma and doesn’t have a living will. In this situation decisions about medical care 
(including euthanasia) are made by the responsible party. The final kind of consent state 
is non-voluntary, where a person expresses a clear wish not to be euthanized and it is 
done against that person’s will. Insofar as non-voluntary euthanasia involves killing a 
person against their will, it is generally regarded as deeply wrong.  
These types of euthanasia and consent states can be mixed and matched to describe 
different ways euthanasia can take place. To do this, pick one type of euthanasia (passive 
or active) and one type on consent (voluntary, involuntary, non-voluntary) and put them 
together. For example, if I describe something as passive involuntary euthanasia it is 
clear that this involves a situation in which a patient doesn’t have the ability to express 
whether or not they want to be euthanized so a second party makes that decision and the 
individual is euthanized by removing some life-sustaining measure. For the purpose of 
discussing the moral distinction between killing and letting die, I will be focusing strictly 
on active voluntary euthanasia in this paper. These are situations in which the suffering 
patient is in a clear state of mind, wants to be euthanized, and it is done by a second party 
acting upon them to cause their death.  
III. Historical Background 
The word euthanasia literally translates to “the good death” (Carrick, 2001). In the 
ancient Greco-Roman world the term euthanasia didn’t mean the same thing that it does 
in our contemporary vernacular. The focus of the word then was on the psychological and 
spiritual aspects of the person who was euthanized, in contrast to our contemporary usage 
where euthanasia refers more to a method of dying. The question in antiquity was not 
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about how they died but what their state of mind was like when they died. According to 
Paul Carrick in his book Medical Ethics in the Ancient World (2001) “the pivotal ancient 
question regarding euthanasia in its broadest sense was, typically: Did the subject 
voluntarily meet death with peace of mind and minimal pain?” (Carrick, 2001, p. 149).  
In further describing “the good death” Carrick also uses words such as “easy” and 
“efficient” (Carrick, 2001, p. 147-149). 
Another difference between the Greco-Roman and contemporary use of the word 
euthanasia is the role of doctors. When the term euthanasia was used in the ancient 
Greco-Roman world there was no place for a doctor. Euthanasia during this time period 
was often spoken of as if it were equivalent to suicide, which means that the moral issues 
discussed basically revolved around the question “is it right to purposely cause your own 
death?” Although the majority of the Greco-Roman world did covet euthanasia and 
maintained hope that they would have the chance to choose how they would die, there 
were some prominent names that maintained moral qualms regarding euthanasia, 
including Aristotle and Pythagoras (Carrick, 2001, p. 153, 160).  
The common sentiment that one had the right to take their own life is summed up by 
Carrick when he says “to have the capacity to willfully depart from life was viewed as the 
greatest boon to mankind; it constituted a real choice that epitomized moral freedom” 
(Carrick, 2001, p. 163). In the same book Carrick discusses a philosopher who lived 
during this time period that believed euthanasia to be “the good death.” Seneca, a 
philosopher in the stoic tradition, ended up dying by cutting his wrists in anticipation of 
his former student, Nero, executing him for treason. Seneca gave the analogy of life 
being a banquet and said of dying something like “only the fool would attempt to oppose 
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death; the wise man would arrange to meet it head on if he could, timing his exit from 
this world with the aplomb of a thoughtful dinner guest who seeks to avoid boring or 
detaining his hosts. Hence, the wise man withdraws from life’s banquet in just the right 
way, under just the right conditions” (Carrick, 2001, p. 162).  
Euthanasia is a controversial subject in modern America, with many people taking the 
stance that active euthanasia is always immoral. One can clearly see the public opinion of 
active euthanasia vs. passive euthanasia by looking at the laws that have been passed 
regarding it. At this point in time active euthanasia is banned in 48 out of the 50 states. It 
was legalized by the Death and Dignity Act in Oregon in 1994 and in Washington State 
in 2008. It was put up for a vote in Massachusetts in 2012 but it didn’t pass, and remains 
illegal. On the other hand, in all 50 U.S. states passive euthanasia is legal. One way to 
explain this is the difference in how we use the term compared to the ancient Greco-
Roman world. To modern Americans euthanasia is an action, it is an act that someone 
performs on another person and has very little to do with the state of mind of the 
suffering person. In fact, unless the person suffering is mentally ill and unable to make 
the decision to be euthanized law makers, judges, and other prominent figures in this 
debate rarely discuss the patient at all. Much of the text being written in this debate is 
about the doctors performing euthanasia and their Hippocratic Oath, the idea is similar to 
“a doctor should never cause harm and killing a person is harming them”. This is what 
allows the killing vs. letting die debate to be so prominent in the topic of euthanasia. Is it 
right to think that letting a person die is morally permissible while actively causing the 
person’s death, in the relevant circumstances, is morally wrong? The answers to this 
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question seem to focus on the doctor’s Hippocratic Oath more than the patient’s 
suffering. 
IV. Smith and Jones 
The first article I analyzed that is related to the difference between killing and letting 
die is “Active and Passive Euthanasia” by James Rachels (2010). Rachels wrote this as a 
response to the seemingly common idea that passive euthanasia is morally better than 
active euthanasia. In this essay Rachels attempted to make the case that active euthanasia 
is morally no worse than passive euthanasia if you are basing that difference on the 
grounds that passive euthanasia is an act of letting die while active euthanasia is an act of 
killing. He does this by giving two scenarios that attempt to show that there is no moral 
difference between killing a person and letting that person die if all other factors are the 
same. If Rachels is correct and shows that there isn’t a morally relevant distinction 
between killing and letting die then it is illogical for passive euthanasia to be legal and 
active euthanasia to be illegal based on the premise “killing someone is morally worse 
than letting them die”.  
In order to prove that there isn’t a moral distinction between killing and letting die 
Rachels gives two nearly identical scenarios where the only difference between them is 
one is a case of killing and the other is a case of letting die (Fig. 1). In each case there is a 
man who stands to inherit a large sum of money should his six year old cousin die. One 
man is named Smith, and the other is named Jones. Both Smith and Jones want this 
money, and because of their greed plan to go into the bathroom and drown their nephew 
while he is taking a bath. Smith goes into the bathroom, holds the child under the water 
until he stops breathing and makes everything look like it was an accident. Jones goes 
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into the bathroom with the same plan, but by his own good luck as Jones is walking into 
the bathroom the child slips, hits his head, and falls under the water of his own fault. In 
this case, Jones stands above the bathtub to ensure that his cousin does not wake back up  
and live, and Jones is 
perfectly willing should 
the child get back up to 
hold him under the water 
by force. However, force 
is not necessary as the 
child does not get back 
up and dies with Jones 
watching him.  
After reading these 
cases, one is supposed to have the intuition that both Smith and Jones are equally 
reprehensible people. If they are equally reprehensible people, then we have to ask what 
is it about the story that is making us judge them in that way. In the story we are given 
that everything is exactly the same except that Smith killed the child and Jones simply let 
the child die. Because those are the only factors that are not the same, they are the factors 
we are isolating and judging in these scenarios. If it is the case that our intuitions are 
telling us that Smith and Jones are equally morally reprehensible, then our intuitions are 
telling us that killing is morally equivalent to letting die. Rachels claims that Jones cannot 
defend himself on the basis of the killing and letting die distinction. No one would accept 
his argument if his defense was something like this: “After all, I didn’t do anything 
Smith  Jones 
Inherits large sum of 
money should 6yr old 
cousin die 
 
Inherits large sum of 
money should 6yr old 
cousin die 
Plans to go into bathroom 
and drown the child  
Plans to go into bathroom 
and drown the child 
Motivated to this by 
greed  
Motivated to this by 
greed 
Drowns child- makes it 
look like accident 
 
Child happens to be 






Figure 1. Comparison of the two scenarios related to 
euthanasia where the variable is clearly isolated as the only 
difference between them.  
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except just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn’t kill him: I only let him die” 
(Rachels, 2010). 
V. Similarity Criterion 
Before I move on to the reply to Rachels’ argument given by William Nesbitt, I want 
to discuss what makes Rachels’ argument work. It should be clear that by giving two 
identical scenarios, except that Smith kills and Jones lets die, that Rachels is attempting 
to isolate the factors in killing versus letting die. We are rarely, if ever, able to make  a 
judgment about killing and letting die that is not influenced by other factors, like 
intentions, goals, etc. When Rachels takes away the differing other factors and gives us a 
situation in which the only difference is killing and letting die, much like in physical 
science, the isolated factors are what we should be measuring. This method of isolating 
the action we are morally evaluating has been called many different things, but here I 
refer to it as “The Similarity Criterion”. 
Rachels is not the only author interested in the moral distinction between killing and 
letting die that uses this kind of criterion. He is in the company of other prominent (and 
not so prominent) names in philosophy that follow the same train of thought such as 
Judith Lichtenberg1, Peter Singer2, and Joachim Asscher3. Each of these people 
recognize this concept: that in order to measure killing and letting die in a way that will 
allow us to be able to tell if there is a moral distinction between them, killing and letting 
                                                 
1Lichtenberg, J. (1994). The moral equivalence of action and omission. In B. Steinbock  
& A. Norcross (Eds.),Killing and Letting Die (2nd ed., p. 213). Bronx, NY: Fordham  
University Press. 
2Singer, P. (1993). Practical ethics. (2nd ed., pp. 207-213). New York, NY: The Press  
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. 
3 Asscher, J. (2007). Killing and letting die: The similarity criterion. Journal of Applied 
Philosophy , 24(3), 271-283. 
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die must be the only difference in any given scenario. In the same article, “Active and 
Passive Euthanasia”, Rachels says that we could not “be confident it is this difference and 
not some other that account for any variation in the assessment of the two cases” (p. 285) 
if multiple variables differed. The next article I discuss is William Nesbitt’s reply to 
James Rachels, and in his article Nesbitt initially seems to be denying the similarity 
criterion. 
VI. Nesbitt’s Rebuttal 
Nesbitt seems to deny the similarity criterion in his article “Is Killing No Worse than 
Letting Die?” (2010) when he states that the reason we judge the cases like we do is 
because the cases are “too similar”. In fact, “not only do Rachels Smith and Jones, for 
example, have identical motives, but both are guilty of the same moral offence” (p. 289). 
Nesbitt contends here that we are confused about what we are judging in the cases and 
that we are not actually looking at merely the difference between killing vs. letting die 
alone. He argues that we are also taking into account their willingness to kill. The 
willingness to kill the child is something that each one had and was motivated out of 
personal gain. This shared willingness to kill is what generates the moral intuition that 
Jones is as bad as Smith.  
Rachels makes a very clear and compelling case for why killing and letting die are 
morally equivalent and Nesbitt would have a hard time (as anyone would) trying to deny 
that point. This is one good reason to believe he is not trying to deny Rachels’ claims or 
the similarity criterion. Nesbitt agrees with the idea that, all other factors being equal, 
there is no moral distinction between killing and letting die. Nesbitt is trying to say that 
what is relevant when we are judging the act is the intention, and in the case Rachels 
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provided their intentions are equal. What is relevant to the moral decision we make about 
the case are the intentions of the actors. Smith and Jones have the same willingness to kill 
and this is why we judge them similarly. 
In order to help illustrate his point Nesbitt gives us a modified case where Jones does 
not have the willingness to kill. In this case all other factors remain the same, Smith and 
Jones still have a young nephew who they stand to inherit a large sum of money from 
should he die and Smith does the same thing he did in the original case, kills the child by 
drowning him and leaves the room making it look like an accident. Jones on the other 
hand, has a moral reluctance to kill in this case. So Jones is just walking by and sees the 
child slip and start to drown. Jones goes over to the water, delighted at his good fortune 
and watches the boy drown. If he should get back up Jones would not hold him back 
down because Jones will not kill, but he does let the child die and then goes on about his 
day. Nesbitt says that in this case our intuitions should tell us that Smith is much worse 
for killing the child than Jones is for letting him die. 
Nesbitt seems to suggest that the most important part in these scenarios is the fact that 
both Smith and Jones had a willingness to kill.  This is the specific intention that Nesbitt 
wants to point out, that if in fact Jones had not had a willingness to kill that we would not 
have judged Smith and Jones the same. Nesbitt points out that when Rachels says that 
Jones “let the child drown” he is neglecting the crucial fact that Jones would have killed 
the child had it become necessary- he was simply lucky that it did not become necessary. 
The problem with this case is that Nesbitt does not make it clear why the similarity 
criterion doesn’t apply. Why shouldn’t we just accept Rachels point that killing and 
letting die are morally equivalent and move on? In fact, the entire article written by 
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Nesbitt is confusing and he never makes the point of what he is trying to do clear enough. 
This is why people have different ideas about what he is saying. If he still believes that 
there is a morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die he is clearly wrong 
because Rachels case against that was excellent. It seems that what Nesbitt is trying to 
communicate is the distinction between killing and letting die alone is not the main moral 
distinction in euthanasia cases. So what is? Nesbitt thinks that it is a willingness to kill, 
which gets him closer to the real distinction. However, because he isn’t clear with what 
he is trying to do he still misses the mark.  
VII. Willingness to Kill vs. No Willingness to Kill 
From Rachels argument it is clear that killing and letting die (when no other factors 
are involved) are morally equivalent. This idea has major implications in the realm of 
medical euthanasia. If one believes the only real reason to make active voluntary 
euthanasia illegal is that it is killing (which I suspect is a common view), then if we prove 
that killing is morally equivalent to letting die it may follow that it doesn’t make any 
sense for active euthanasia to be illegal while passive is legal. Given that passive 
voluntary euthanasia is already legal it would easily follow that active voluntary 
euthanasia should be legalized.  
The point I think Nesbitt it trying to make now becomes important in the discussion. 
He claims that even if it were the case that killing and letting die are morally equivalent 
actual euthanasia cases have a more relevant factor to analyze- this is the willingness to 
kill of the doctor. By responding to Rachels through bringing in the willingness to kill 
distinction Nesbitt is trying to say that this is the distinction that matters in cases of 
euthanasia. If he is correct, Rachels could be right that killing is morally the same as 
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letting die and yet still not be right that active euthanasia is no worse than passive 
euthanasia. Nesbitt is saying that there is a moral difference between being willing to kill 
someone and being willing to let someone die, and this is the really morally relevant 
factor we should be discussing when comparing active and passive euthanasia. We 
should not be using the killing and letting die distinction at all, but rather this one which 
gets closer to what an actual case of euthanasia would be like.  
In cases of real life euthanasia neither the intentions of the actors nor the 
circumstances of the cases are the same. If we think back to Smith and Jones, the single 
act that we are judging is the one which would allow them to kill their young nephew in 
order to gain his wealth. It is this complete isolation of the variables that gives Rachels’ 
the ability to win this argument and say there isn’t a moral difference. In real life cases 
this doesn’t happen, typically the intentions of someone performing active euthanasia are 
different than a person performing passive euthanasia. Because Nesbitt makes the point 
that no real life cases can follow this type of analysis to decide the morality of the 
practice he believes we need to judge euthanasia on a different factor. This is why Nesbitt 
is closer to a real answer in the euthanasia debate, he is bringing in factors that can be 
analyzed (aka intentions) with all the other relevant information where Rachels’ takes 
away all the information to analyze his two variables. 
In cases of active voluntary euthanasia a doctor has to have a willingness to kill, 
whereas in cases of passive voluntary euthanasia a doctor only has to have a willingness 
to let die. A huge flaw in the response Nesbitt gives is the confusion with which he leaves 
the reader. He needs to be clearer in his argument and make it obvious to the reader that 
this is why the former should be illegal while the latter can remain legal. Active 
14 
 
euthanasia requires us to have doctors in hospitals that have a willingness to kill and this 
is what Nesbitt thinks is the morally damning factor, and the one that should be focused 
on when making decisions about the legality of euthanasia as a whole.  
The distinction that Nesbitt really makes (about the morality of willingness to kill vs. 
unwillingness to kill) is one through which the current debate can be furthered. Nesbitt 
may, to his critics, say something like ‘killing and letting die are morally equivalent. 
However, there aren’t real life cases of euthanasia where killing and letting die are the 
real factors we are judging. It is more relevant in these real life cases to make the 
distinction between a doctor who is willing to kill and one who is not’. I believe that this 
is closer to what the really relevant factor in the morality of euthanasia is, but I believe it 
is still flawed. Nesbitt takes for granted that our intuition or immediate reasoning will tell 
us that willingness to kill in a person is always worse than willingness to let die. But is it? 
The problem with all of the aforementioned cases lies in the framing of them as a way 
to harm people. Everything seems to shift, especially in regard to having a willingness to 
kill, when you make a case where killing would be with the intention to help a person. 
This is where all the other cases are confused, they can’t correspond to euthanasia 
correctly because the cases are always framed by asking if there is a distinction between 
killing and letting die or willingness to kill and unwillingness to kill when the object is to 
harm. In euthanasia, the object is to help the patient; the cases we are considering should 
be framed by this idea. Take for example, the scenario of a police officer trying to stop 
the probable suffering of hostages in a stand-off situation. In order to end the situation 
quickly, with as little violence as possible, I think most people would agree that the cop 
who is willing to kill the hostage taker is morally correct in his decision. More than that, I 
15 
 
think we could further agree that the cop who is willing to kill the hostage taker in an 
effort to save the hostages is morally better than a cop who in the same situation would 
merely be willing to let the hostage taker die. Here we have a scenario in which we can 
more clearly see how a willingness to kill (when akin to a willingness to help) is morally 
better than a willingness to let die. The intention is to help, not to harm, and the cases we 
should look at need to reflect that.  
VIII. The Real Distinction  
Although willingness to kill vs. unwillingness to kill seems to be closer to the moral 
distinction we should be focusing on in euthanasia cases, it has the fatal flaw of assuming 
that a willingness to kill is always a bad thing. Nesbitt at certain points in his paper paints 
the world as if we would all be in significantly less danger should everyone only have a 
willingness to let die rather than a willingness to kill. However, in most legal euthanasia 
cases willingness to kill can stem from a desire to help those in need. We shouldn’t have 
the quick response that people with a willingness to kill are “obviously dangerous”. In the 
case that Nesbitt established where willingness to kill was worse than willingness to let 
die it was because someone was being harmed. In cases of euthanasia the goal is to assist 
a person. No one is being harmed, even though there is a willingness to kill. In real cases 
willingness to kill is the same thing as the doctor being willing to assist.  
This is where both Nesbitt and Rachels are misleading. In Rachels’ example both men 
are motivated to kill/let die by personal gain, which would obviously go against our 
moral intuitions. Nesbitt says we need to get closer to real life cases of euthanasia and 
claims that in Rachels’ case what we are really judging is the actors’ willingness to kill. 
Nesbitt is correct in that we should get closer to real life cases of euthanasia, but he is 
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equally misleading in his counter-example because the malice of the actor is still present. 
Real life cases of euthanasia almost always stem from a desire to help the person that is 
suffering. In fact, in real life cases a willingness to kill can often be seen as morally better 
than a willingness to let die because it prevents the pain and suffering of “allowing” the 
patient to die of natural causes that is passive euthanasia.  
So, killing and letting die are morally equivalent acts when they are only measured 
against one another with no other relevant factors in the cases. However, euthanasia in 
real life is never the kind of decision that can be done without many morally relevant 
factors being examined. Nesbitt, in order to get closer to how morality would be decided 
in real life cases, makes a distinction between a person who is willing to kill and one who 
is only willing to let die. While Rachels is correct about killing and letting die, Nesbitt 
comes much closer to the moral distinction that should be considered in real life cases 
with his argument about willingness.  But, if it is the case that a willingness to kill is 
equivalent to a willingness to help (in most euthanasia cases it is) then Nesbitt cannot use 
this distinction to argue against active euthanasia.  
So, neither Rachels nor Nesbitt have currently described a completely relevant 
argument. The killing and letting die distinction doesn’t seem relevant because real life 
cases aren’t judged on the basis of killing and letting die. When Nesbitt brings up 
willingness to kill he seems to get closer to what we are trying to judge in real life cases, 
but doesn’t exactly hit the nail on the head because he doesn’t discuss how willingness to 
kill can stem from a deeper desire to help the patient and end needless suffering. So we 
have to go a little further than both of these ideas and say that the real morally relevant 
factor is the intentions of the doctor in each case. As mentioned earlier, much of the 
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discussion around euthanasia is asking whether it is moral or not for the doctor to 
perform euthanasia. When we ask about euthanasia we are often asking if it is okay for a 
doctor to kill a person under certain conditions. Those conditions greatly vary, and the 
intentions of the doctor should be judged on a case by case basis.  
What this means for the legality of euthanasia is complicated. Due to the fact that the 
morality individually rests within the doctors’ intentions, it wouldn’t make sense to make 
any type of euthanasia illegal. You can’t judge whether a case of euthanasia should be 
morally permitted or not if active euthanasia is illegal before the case is even made. In 
this “case by case basis” way of judging morality of euthanasia each case would have to 
be individually looked at, and one relevant factor would be that you would need a doctor 
who is willing to kill because of the fact that it is helpful to the patient to relieve his or 
her pain and suffering.  
The distinction we need to look at to decide the morality of any euthanasia case is the 
specific information about that specific case as analyzed each time. Killing vs. letting die 
or willingness to kill vs. unwillingness to kill alone are not able to account for all the 
contingencies of a euthanasia request. Far reaching laws that generalize active voluntary 
euthanasia as “always right” or “always wrong” will never be able to get to the intricacies 
present in each case. A huge benefit of taking this view about the legality of euthanasia is 
that it relates to our current common sense views about the practice. If we analyze the 
morality on a case by case basis we are able to take things into consideration like the 
level and speed of deterioration in the patient, the history and intentions of the doctor in 




A popular view on passive versus active euthanasia is that the morality of each lies in 
the distinction between killing and letting die. However, Rachels has shown quite 
effectively that there is not a moral difference between killing and letting die when all 
other factors are equivalent and fixed (this is based on something like the Similarity 
Criterion). We then saw how unrealistic it is to fix all other factors in real life cases of 
euthanasia where there is more than just a difference between killing and letting die in 
play. Nesbitt has shown that there is a need for willingness to kill in active euthanasia, 
while there is only a need for willingness to let die in passive euthanasia.  Here Nesbitt 
argues that we tend to think it is worse to be willing to kill someone rather than to just let 
them die, and that it is this difference which gives justification to the idea passive 
euthanasia is morally better than active euthanasia. Yet, when we realize that in real life 
cases of euthanasia this willingness to kill comes from the desire to help a person and end 
their needless suffering, we see that active euthanasia stems not only from honorable 
motives but may in fact be the most moral way to act in that situation. The examples 
given by Rachels and Nesbitt are both misleading, and therefore irrelevant to deciding the 
legality of euthanasia, because they are cases where the actors intentions are to harm 
another person. If this analysis is correct, then what we should be asking is if it is 
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